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 Abstract 
 
 
This study is an exploratory historical analysis of the factors that have influenced 
the evolution of military Information Assurance (IA) programs from World War I to the 
present.  Although the term IA has recently been widely used throughout the Information 
Resource Management field (IRM), evidence indicates that information and information 
systems protection mechanisms were used during every U.S. Military conflict.  This 
research proposes to increase the body of knowledge within the information systems 
management field by exploring the areas related to Information Assurance (IA) and the 
ultimate goal of U. S. Defensive Information Warfare.   
I found that significant events related to the protection of information and 
information systems security throughout each U.S. Military conflict led to the 
implementation of IA concepts.  The evaluation of these events provides information that 
reveals a common approach to IA throughout history and supports the identification of 
key concepts that have influenced this evolutionary process and shaped the role of IA in 
current military operations, with indicators of how it may be used in the future.    
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AN ANALYSIS OF FACTORS THAT HAVE INFLUENCED THE  
EVOLUTION OF INFORMATION ASSURANCE FROM  
WORLD WAR I THROUGH VIETNAM TO THE PRESENT 
 
 
 I.  Introduction 
 
 
Overview 
World War I (WWI) introduced numerous technological advancements that 
revolutionized the nature of twentieth century warfare (AMH, 1989).  Such 
advancements also paved the way for many of the Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA) 
that have taken place since then.  In his book, Lifting the Fog of War, Admiral Bill 
Owens states that “the technological base of the current RMA remains the central 
component of a transformed twenty-first century American fighting force.”  He also 
states that “this RMA will be the best hope for the United States to keep its armed forces 
superior to any other nation’s (Owens, 2000).”  The technological strides made from 
WWI forward set the stage for further advancements of military capabilities and expertise 
throughout the history of U.S. military operations.  According to Andrew Krepinevich, 
RMA is described as a dynamic process: 
“An RMA occurs when the application of new technologies into a 
significant number of systems combines with innovative operational 
concepts and organizational adaptation in a way that fundamentally alters 
the character and conduct of conflict.  It does so by producing a dramatic 
increase-often an order of magnitude or greater-in the combat potential 
and military effectiveness of armed forces" (Krepinevich, 1994: 30).  
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Such innovative approaches have continued to change the way military operations are 
conducted.  This trend will likely continue well into the future.   
A wide array of computer and network hardware and software that can be 
adaptable for military use will empower the U.S. Military to maintain combat superiority 
over adversaries well into the twenty-first century (Owens, 2000).  This goal cannot be 
achieved without the highest levels of Information Assurance (IA), which provides the 
basic building blocks for the protection and defense of information and information 
systems.  Joint Publication 3-13, a document developed by the Department of Defense 
(DOD), defines IA as the protection and defense of systems by ensuring their availability, 
integrity, identification, confidentiality, and non-repudiation (JP 3-13, 1998).  These 
fundamental terms form the building blocks for successful IA.  There are several different 
definitions of these five terms, however, Maconachy (2001), McKnight (2002), and 
Cummings (2002) assembled definitions that reveal key aspects of IA as characterized by 
this research effort.       
• Authentication is verification of the originator.  A security service 
designed to establish the validity of a transmission, message, or 
originator.  It ensures that the information originated from a specific 
known source.  It verifies the identity of the user, device, or other 
entity in a computer system, often as a prerequisite to allowing access 
to resources in a system.  It ensures that you have the right to see the 
information, and that you are who you say you are.   
 
• Availability is the assured access to data by authorized users.  It is the 
state where information is in the place needed by the user, at the time 
the user needs it, and in the form needed by the user.  One key is 
timely delivery of information and that the information presented in a 
form that is wanted and can be understood.  Can be related to security 
services including back-up power, spare data channels, off site 
capabilities, and continuous signals.  
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• Confidentiality is the protection from unauthorized disclosure.  It is the 
concept of holding sensitive data in confidence, limiting it to an 
appropriate set of individuals or organizations.  Referred to as 
information security and addresses the issues of clearances and a need 
to know. 
 
• Integrity is the protection from unauthorized change.  It involves 
information or communications that are sound, unimpaired, and in 
perfect condition.  Looks at the overall architecture of the system 
including how it is designed, implemented, and maintained. 
 
• Non Repudiation is the undeniable proof of participation in a 
communication.  It is a service that provides proof of the integrity and 
origin of data in an unforgettable relationship, which can be verified 
by any third party at any time.  It involves a communication that is 
genuine and cannot be refuted.  Key aspects are proof of origin, 
submission, and delivery. 
 
The terms identified above can be further characterized as security concepts relating to 
the point to point communications or internet transmissions; confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability and security concepts relating to people; authentication, authorization, and 
non-repudiation.  These terms also represent a desired end state accomplished by the 
overall organizational goal. 
This thesis will explore the areas related to IA and the ultimate goal of Defensive 
Information Warfare throughout the history of the U. S. Military from WWI through 
Vietnam to the present.  This research will be qualitative and rely on historical 
perspectives of various documentation and personal accounts relating to IA and building 
theory on the evolution of IA and the ultimate goal of information superiority (IS).   
Joint Vision 2020, developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, defines IS as, “the 
capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while 
exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same (JV2020, 2000).”  JV2020 
also states that Information Superiority is a key enabler of the transformation of military 
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operational capability during peace and conflict (JV2020, 2000).  It has been widely 
accepted that the one who controls the flow of information to the battlefield will emerge 
the victor.  According to a recent research effort, this phenomenon will continue to 
expand the capabilities of the warfighter:  
“The proliferation of information technologies will continue to shape the 
behavior of military operations…unlike early military research and 
development where technologies were created and advanced internally, 
information and computing technology is largely commercialized and 
therefore available to all” (Knode, 2003). 
 
The most recent capabilities of IS were seen first hand during Operation Iraqi Freedom 
and ongoing operations in the gulf region.  Most people observed this phenomenon take 
shape by tuning into CNN, Fox News, or MSNBC, where they watched embedded 
journalists with military units, and daily updates from various military leaders.  Only 
recently have such advances in technology been so readily available.  In the past, various 
data was just as important, however, it took much longer to transform such data into 
usable information.  We are now seeing first hand how information technologies have 
transformed military operations.  The protection of these various advancements in 
information technologies, which assists in the formulation of communications strategies, 
is equally important.   
The U. S. Military is an agile force capable of sustaining the technological and 
operational capability needed to win America’s battles.  The success of this technological 
capability will depend on IA initiatives and will ultimately lead to IS over adversaries.  
Normal military operations have demonstrated the constant need for IA.   This need is 
infinitely greater once crisis or conflict become apparent.  IA forms the foundation of 
defensive information warfare, which protects information resources from attack 
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(Denning, 1999: 12).  The foundation of effective information operations (IO) is also 
imbedded in IA strategies.  IA focuses on the defensive or protective aspect of 
information systems during Information Operations (IO).  Joint Publication (JP 3-13, 
1998) defines IO as actions taken to affect adversary information and information 
systems while defending one’s own information and information systems from attack 
Figure 1 shows that IA is the only element of information operations represented across 
the entire spectrum from peace, to crises, to conflict, and back to peace again.    
 
Figure 1: Relationships across time (JP 3-13, 1998: I-4) 
 
To achieve total protection of information and information systems from attack, IA 
programs must meet the commander’s needs across the entire spectrum of events.  
Additionally, IA must coexist with information warfare and special information 
INFORMATION  
ASSURANCE 
INFORMATION 
WARFARE 
INFORMATION OPERATIONS
SPECIAL INFORMATION
OPERATIONS 
Peace            Crises               Conflict                    Peace 
Intelligence
INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
RELATIONSHIPS ACROSS TIME
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operations during the crises and conflict spectrum.  This relationship must be dynamic 
and complementary to ensure the highest degree of dominance.  Although this strategy 
has only recently been identified as such, military operations in the past have also relied 
on a similar operational activities that ensure appropriate levels of IO   
Some aspects of IO will only take place during crises and conflict and others will 
take place at various stages throughout the entire spectrum.  IA must occur throughout 
because the basic defensive measures will often help prevent crisis and conflict.  
Although this format is only recently been incorporated into military doctrine, current 
military leaders indicate that IO in relation to IA has always been structured similarly (JP 
3-13, 1998: II-8). 
 
Problem Statement 
 
Although the term IA has only recently been widely used throughout the 
Information Resource Management field (IRM), there is a strong indication that 
information and information system protection mechanisms were used during every U.S. 
Military conflict from WWI forward and that the ultimate goal of IS has lead to a certain 
level of IA throughout.  To understand its importance, it may be valuable to trace IA 
related concepts back through various military conflicts.  The evaluation of these 
conflicts can be used to provide key characteristics of IA throughout that time.  This 
research effort will explore how past military conflicts have also relied on IA during 
defensive information warfare as far back as WWI even though such efforts were not 
referred to as IA.  The goal will be the identification of concepts that have influenced this 
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evolutionary process and shaped the role of IA in current and future military 
environments.    
 
Research Question 
IA is expected to be an integral element in the process that leads to IS in future 
military operations.  Since this goal of achieving IS will continue to be paramount, it may 
be useful to explore the role of concepts related to the protection of information and 
information systems in past and current military operations and how such concepts will 
influence the future.  What are the factors that have influenced the evolution of IA from 
WWI through Vietnam to the present? 
 
Investigative Questions 
 
1. Prior to the establishment of IA programs, what key programs 
were established to protect information and information systems in 
the U.S. Military from WWI through Vietnam to the present? 
 
2. What is an appropriate evolutionary model of IA given military 
operations from WWI through Vietnam to the present?  
 
3. What lessons can we learn from the implementation of IA 
programs and the evolutionary model of IA? 
 
Methodology 
The research methodology chosen for this thesis effort will center on historical 
research techniques.  According to Nel (1983), historical research is: 
“The systematic process of collecting and objectively evaluating data 
related to past occurrences to arrive at conclusions about the causes, 
effects, or trends of past events that may be helpful in explaining the 
present or anticipating events.” 
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Being able to interpret perspectives from various documents and personal accounts gives 
benefit to historical research.  Since it deals with the meaning of events, the heart of the 
historical method is not only the accumulation of facts, but also the interpretation of the 
facts (Leedy, 2001).  The focus of this historical research will be to trace the evolution of 
information assurance initiatives.  The intent will be to identify programs and initiatives 
developed to assist with the protection and defense of information and information 
systems during military operations.  The purpose will be to identify specific aspects still 
present or those that have changed with technology and time.   
I will develop of an overall evolutionary model based on factors that relate to 
information assurance, information operations, information warfare, and current and past 
military operations.  Additionally, I will parallel related factors with information that 
supports the validity or lack thereof by other historical documentation on this subject. 
 
Scope and Limitations 
 
The overall focus of this research effort will center on the historical perspective of 
information assurance during military operations and the critical time between conflicts 
and the identification of potential doctrinal changes.  This research effort will focus on 
the U.S. Military during various operations since WWI through Vietnam related to IA in 
its current form.  Limiting this effort to this period and concepts will narrow the overall 
analytical scope and provide a snapshot into a specific time when electronic and 
communication advancements began to enhance the technological competence of the 
warfighter.  This research will focus on documentation that explores Command, Control, 
Communications, computers and Intelligence (C4I); military leadership; decision-making 
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processes; and defensive measures that concentrate on the protection of information and 
information system resources. 
 
Significance 
 
Advancements in technology and innovation continue to produce constant change 
in military environments.  These advancements also provide a clear understanding of 
concepts that aid certain evolutional aspects over time.  This research is intended to assist 
in the understanding of the evolving role of IA in the U.S. Military.   
 
Thesis Overview 
 
Chapter One included a brief overview of the background information, a 
description of the overall methodology, presentation of the research questions, and the 
intended significance of this research effort.  Chapter Two reviews the research 
methodology and overall theory and provides justification for using various historical 
approaches and IA models.  Chapter Three explores current literature on the historical 
perspectives of warfare and the protection of information and summarizes background 
information pertinent to Information Operations (IO) strategies related to aspects of 
Defensive Counter Information (DCI) under the IA domain.  Chapter Four discusses the 
findings from an analysis of the information presented in Chapter Three including 
research questions one and two.  Finally, Chapter Five provides a discussion of research 
question three, limitations, suggestions for future research, and conclusions.  
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II.  Methodology 
 
Introduction  
Chapter One provided background information, described the research problem, 
and briefly discussed the research scope and methodology.  This chapter will describe the 
methodology used to investigate the research problem and theory proposed in chapter 
one.  This chapter will also provide justification for using the historical research method 
for Management Information Systems (MIS), the National Security Agency’s 
Information Assurance Model (IAM), and the Information Assurance Model presented by 
McCumber and Maconachy et al. 
 
Research Methodology 
A historical research methodology was chosen for this thesis effort.  Historical 
research is defined as a systematic process designed to collect and objectively evaluate 
data related to past occurrences to arrive at conclusions that may be helpful in explaining 
the present (Nel, 1983).  Historical research also uses inductive reasoning approaches to 
build theories that ultimately draw conclusions about entire classes of events.  Leedy et al 
(2001) describes historical research as separate and individual facts observed by the 
researcher and used to assist with the establishment of a specific theory.  The goal of this 
research effort is to build theory by using a specific framework and interpreting the 
information and facts presented.  Since historical research involves independent 
investigation, it is important to ensure that common problems do not plaque this effort.  
Borg et al (2002) discusses two common problems with historical research.  First, it is 
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difficult to maintain rigor or avoid external criticism of the use of non-authentic sources.  
Secondly, maintaining objectivity or avoiding the biases and distortions that define 
internal criticism can lead to additional problems.  Reflecting on the purposes of history 
as a mirror, the French philosopher Michel Foucalt commented: 
“The final trait of effective history is it’s affirmation of knowledge as 
perspective.  Historians take unusual pains to erase the elements of their 
work which reveal their grounding in a particular time and space, their 
preferences in a controversy – the unavoidable obstacles of their passion.”   
 
In Paul Godfrey’s (1996) assessment of Mr. Foucalt’s assessment he states: 
“Foucalt’s evaluation of history demonstrates that any treatise that goes 
beyond the mere recitation of chronological events, speaks more about the 
researcher’s own intellectual, moral, and emotional location than about a 
“correct” evaluation of historical events.  The task must focus on revealing 
the mirror through which history is viewed as well as history itself.”   
 
In other words, it is important to present to others historical facts that are grounded by 
credible sources and thorough interpretation of the pertinent details of the specific topics 
covered. 
To alleviate the risk associated with the problems identified above, the specific 
methodological approach must demonstrate objectivity and accuracy.  To ensure these 
concepts, several libraries were searched for information dealing with IA during past 
military conflicts.  Initially, the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) along with 
Wright State University and the University of Dayton, all of which are located in Dayton, 
Ohio, were used as primary research facilities.  Follow on research conducted at Marine 
Corps University (MCU), Quantico, Virginia provided an extensive amount of resources 
related to communications and intelligence during past military conflicts.  MCU was also 
a first rate location and facility for any material related to the history of warfare. 
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Approach 
A historical research approach in MIS developed by academics working on a 
research project at Harvard University’s School of Business provides structure and 
purpose for this current effort.  McKenny et al (1997) developed a seven-step 
methodology for conducting historical research in MIS.  This seven-step process,  
modified to meet the current requirements,  provides a specific structure and an overall 
outline to the period being researched and the presentation of information discovered: 
• Begin with focusing questions.  
• Specify the domain. 
• Tell the story 
• Write the transcript 
• Gather the evidence  
• Critique the evidence 
• Determine patterns. 
 
This seven-step process helps to establish the specific format needed to view pertinent 
information used to analyze present circumstances throughout the MIS field.  The steps 
identified will also lead the researcher and research towards the development of a robust 
MIS historical research theory.   
Current IA theory identified in chapter one discusses the five building blocks for 
any successful IA program; availability, integrity, identification, confidentiality, and non-
repudiation (JP 3-13, 1998).  As the current IA theory focuses on these building blocks, it 
is important to demonstrate where this information fits into the historical domain.  
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Theories developed by McKenny et al (1997) support these building blocks by 
demonstrating how history and historical research provides a backdrop from which to 
determine what is novel in any current situation and which factors serve to distinguish  
the present from developments of the past.  Stanford (1986) describes the structure of 
historical research as follows: 
 
Figure 2:  Structure of History (Stanford, 1986) 
 
Bannister (2002) describes the Stanford model as significant in the interpretive processes 
encountered from historical research, over a long period of time, when the researcher 
may not have been present.   
In a study of Bank of America and it’s banking operations achievements, the 
researchers developed the concept of the Dominant Design.  A dominant design is a 
design that has the potential to yield superior results for any organization.  It is generally 
a result of a radical – as opposed to an evolutionary – innovation in an industry.  Even 
though the concept of the dominant design is a result of a radical and not an evolutionary 
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innovation, there is indication throughout the history of U.S. wartime operations that 
dominant design often took place.  As events happened, various processes turned into 
evolutionary events over time and ultimately shaped the outcome of current events.  
McKenny et al (1997) also proposed a framework for information systems research 
during the Bank of America study.  This framework provides a distinct concept that 
further demonstrates the realization of dominant design within the organization.  This  
concept is the cascade approach.  The cascade approach is a conceptual framework for 
describing the development or emergence of an information system.  The following key 
areas make up cascade process approach: 
• Crisis. 
• Search for a technical solution. 
• Initial technical solution found. 
• Adjustments throughout the organization. 
• Assets formed, which resolves crisis. 
• Dominant Design. 
The basis for this framework is developed on the notion that there is a crisis within an 
organization, which is resolved by the use of information technology or system 
(Bannister, 2002).  The crisis within the scope of this research is war or conflict of the  
U.S. military since WWI.  Within the realm of the protection of key communications, 
major crisis, followed by concepts identified in the cascade approach, shaped the tactical 
nature of how various communications activities developed and ultimately changed with 
advancements in technology.  Bannister (2002) also believes that successful completion 
of the cascade process relies on the three roles of the leader, maestro, and super-tech to 
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drive the organization towards the overall goal of the dominant design.  Evidence 
suggests that events related to MIS and IA during past military conflicts have followed 
similar paths towards the creation of new techniques and procedures.      
 The National Security Agency’s (NSA) Information Security Assessment Model 
(IAM) identifies 18 baseline categories that should be included as components of the 
Information Assurance posture of any organization (Hurd, 2001):   
Table 1:  NAS IAM 18 Baseline Categories (Hurd, 2001) 
1 IA Documentation 
2 IA Roles and Responsibilities 
3 Identification & Authentication 
4 Account Management 
5 Session controls 
6 External Connectivity 
7 Telecommunications 
8 Auditing 
9 Virus Protection 
10 Contingency Planning 
11 Maintenance 
12 Configuration Management 
13 Back-Ups 
14 Labeling 
15 Media Sanitization/Disposal 
16 Physical Environment 
17 Personnel Security 
18 Training and Awareness 
 
 
These categories are generally accepted when developing and maintaining systems under 
the information technology (IT) realm (Swanson, 1996).  Even though there are several 
organizations that provide justification of important  categories, the NSA IAM was 
developed specifically for government and commercial organizations and is often 
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referred to as the accepted standard for IA related system certifications to enhance the 
protection of information and the establishment of functional IA programs (Hurd, 2001; 
256). 
 A limited number of models dedicated to the understanding of threats to 
automated information systems are currently available.  The McCumber (1998) model is 
used to appropriately organize the 18 baseline categories for analysis and to address the 
possible threats to automated systems.    This comprehensive model addresses threats and 
functions as an assessment and evaluation tool.  McCumber argues that it is a key concept 
because it is independent of technology and is not constrained by organizational 
differences and thus can be used for systems development.  The three dimensions focus 
on information states, critical information characteristics, and security countermeasures.  
Maconachy et al (2001) expanded the McCumber model to include the theory that we are 
now in an information intensive environment, which broadens the scope and the overall 
understanding of information and systems protection.  The strength of the 
multidisciplinary and multidimensional elements of the McCumber model is in its ability 
to produce or maintain a robust IA program.  Figure 2.3 shows this model and 
demonstrates an integrated approach that accounts for three of the four dimensions of IA, 
information states, security services, and security countermeasures. 
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Figure 3:  Information Assurance Model (Maconachy et al, 2001) 
 
Additionally, Maconachy et al created a fourth dimension, time.  The time dimension of 
the integrated model demonstrates the introduction of new technology over time requires 
modifications to other dimensions of the integrated model in order to restore a system to 
a secure state of operation.  This dimension is related to the notion that certain aspects of 
the McCumber model has changed with innovation and is essential to the theory that IA 
throughout military operations in warfare has evolved from earlier concepts.  Essential 
elemental changes over time were fundamental to the adoption of new technology or 
doctrinal enhancements that were evident during military conflicts.  Such changes to the 
system over time were key aspects of restoring a secure state.        
 Using a current framework such as the Maconachy et al (2001) model to evaluate 
past occurrences will provide evidence about whether the concept currently known as IA 
is valid for earlier U.S. Military conflicts.   A modified list of the baseline categories are 
grouped in Table 1 below using the Maconachy (2001) model.  This grouping will form 
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the foundation for the evolutionary model that will be developed further in this research 
effort.   
Table 2:  IA Model - NSA IAM Mapping 
IA Model 
Dimensions 
NSA IAM Baseline 
Categories 
Information States   
Transmission External Connectivity 
Storage Back-Ups Disposal 
Processing Auditing Session Controls 
Security Counter Measures   
Technology 
Maintenance 
Telecommunications 
Virus Protection 
Policies and Practices 
Account Management 
Configuration Management 
Contingency Planning 
IA Documentation 
IA Roles & Responsibilities 
Media Sanitization 
People 
Awareness 
Personnel Security 
Physical Security 
Training 
 
Each category has specific questions or pertinent information that should be included 
when conducting an IA assessment and will demonstrate the applicability of earlier 
indicators relating to information and information systems protection during the various 
military conflicts since WWI.  Accordingly, significant principles collected and 
organized into two of the four dimensions of the IA Model will be depicted here.  The 
information states and security countermeasures dimensions will form core data elements 
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and demonstrate the applicability of earlier concepts relating to the security of 
information WWI through Vietnam with the present structure of IA.        
 
Justification for Historical Research Method  
 Mason (1997) identifies four products that can result from a MIS historical 
research focus:   
• An account of significant fragment of the past describing events of 
importance to the MIS community.  The account in and of itself is 
informative, but also serves as contextual material for 
understanding other events. 
 
• The resulting historical account may be used subsequently as a 
“datum” in a broad process of inductive reasoning. 
 
• Historical research may serve as the source of new research 
hypotheses. 
 
• Historical research results in a better understanding of the present 
with indicators that will assist in meeting related future 
requirements.       
 
Current technological advancements throughout the IA field have stemmed from 
significant events of the past.  Research that demonstrates how IA has evolved into its 
current structure will fit into any category identified above.  The products of historical 
research are abundant throughout the IS community even though Bannister (2002) 
believes there remains a distinct shortage of good MIS or IS historical studies of 
information systems in organizations and how these systems influence and shape 
organizations over time.  The theory is that the study of IS using historical perspectives is 
still in its infancy.  Over the past 30 years, the focus tends to be either on the history of 
specific technologies, technology companies, or the impact of developments on an 
industry (Bannister, 2002). 
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 The primary intent of this research effort is to produce an initial working model  
to demonstrate a historical perspective on the IA aspect of IS.  This model can also 
provide IA professionals with the support of future initiatives or innovations.  A review 
of existing literature will attempt to disclose information concerning a model that focused 
on the evolution of IA before 1960.  While there is some theory of  IA and information 
system security structures, no current framework focuses on the evolutionary process 
prior to 1960.  This will be accomplished by the systematic research effort outlined and 
supported by research questions discussed in chapter.    
 
Chapter Review 
This chapter discussed the detailed methodology used to investigate the research 
problem and the proposed theory.  This chapter also provided justification for the 
historical research method for Management Information Systems (MIS), the National 
Security Agency’s Information Assurance Methodology (IAM) and the McCumber and 
Maconachy model of Information Assurance. 
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III. Background 
  
Introduction 
The previous chapter described the detailed methodology used to investigate the 
research problem and theory proposed in chapter one.  Additionally, the previous chapter 
provided justification for using the historical research method for Management 
Information Systems (MIS) and the National Security Agency’s Information Assurance 
Model (IAM).  This chapter explores current literature on the historical perspectives of 
warfare and the protection of information from World War I through Vietnam to the 
present.  This chapter also summarizes background information pertinent to Information 
Operations (IO) strategies related to aspects of Defensive Counter Information and the 
Information Assurance (IA) domain.  
 
Early History  
 Before focusing on the current period, I will first explore how early warfare relied 
on various methods of protection of pertinent information from the enemy.  Exploring the 
background of security schemes developed during early warfare will provide a 
foundation for discussing American Military warfare from WWI through Vietnam to the 
present.   
Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery, a British Military commander during 
World War II, described the information security requirement: 
“A good military leader must dominate the events which encompass him; 
once events get the better of him he will lose the confidence of his men, 
and when that happens he ceases to be of value as a leader.  He has 
therefore got to anticipate enemy reactions to his own moves, and to take 
 
 22
steps to prevent enemy interference with his own plans” (Montgomery, 
1968: 16). 
  
While Montgomery’s statement demonstrates the power of combat leadership, the 
protection of key information helps combat leaders gain significant advantage over 
enemies.  The domination of events during warfare facilitates the primary goal of IA, to 
protect and defend information and information systems (JP3-13, 1998).  Confidentiality 
is maintained when information relevant to combat plans is safeguarded from enemy 
commanders.  Throughout the history of the world, records demonstrate how military 
commanders have always wanted to safeguard information related to operational 
strategies and actions to prevent enemy interference with tactics.  At Jericho in 7000 
B.C., precautions taken to fortify the city included walls and moats to keep the enemy out 
(Montgomery, 1968: 29).  These fortifications allowed only enemy speculation of what 
was within those walls.  Other early methods of safeguarding information came in the 
form of torches used for signaling movements; trusted runners used to relay important 
messages to commanders; and trumpets or other instruments used to relay battle 
commands to soldiers (Montgomery, 1968: 39).   
The Arab raiders of early medieval warfare used the element of surprise to gain 
advantage over villagers by overwhelming them before they were fully aware of what 
was happening (Montgomery, 1968: 145).  The element of surprise used by the Arabs 
ensured they had an advantage over the people of the countryside.  Such actions protected 
pertinent battle information until it was too late for a counter attack.  The Greeks made 
great strides in cryptography, which is recognized as one of the earliest forms of 
confidentiality or maintaining privacy of sent messages.  They used fires and torches to 
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send messages representing letters of the Greek alphabet.  Other forms of cryptography 
included shaving the heads of slaves, writing messages and concealing the message by 
letting the hair grow back.  Once the hair returned, the slave was sent to deliver the 
message (Churchhouse, 2002).  Another method involved the Greek scytale.  The scytale 
is a wooden pole used as a transposition cipher by the Spartan military.  The sender 
would write the message along the length of the scytale on a strip of leather or 
parchment, and then unwind the strip, which would appear to carry meaningless letters.  
A person with a staff of the same size, often fabricated at the same place, would be the 
only person able to read the message (Newton, 1998).  Such techniques provided key 
operational instructions and advanced warnings to commanders in the field.  Fires and 
torches also provided ways to assist battle ships navigating the Greek shoals (Wrixon, 
1998).   
At the height of the Roman Empire, Julius Caesar used a combination of signaling 
stations and various ciphers to communicate with his generals.  Caesar is known as one of 
the first persons to have ever employed encryption for the sake of securing messages 
during warfare (Morelli, 2002).  The Caesar cipher was used by Julius Cesar to 
communicate with his armies using Greek letters to mask Latin messages (Wrixon, 1998; 
170).  This encryption procedure used shifting techniques of the normal alphabet in 
plaintext to code messages that were later decoded using a cipher text.  The cipher text 
identifies the actual alphabet substitution technique (Bosworth, 1982).  The techniques 
used by leaders of the great Arab, Roman, and Greek Empires were all aimed at 
protecting the uninterrupted flow of information, which is a key aspect of IA.  These 
early examples demonstrate how the true origins of IA are associated with the most 
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primitive forms of warfare.   They also reveal how the concept of IA has evolved over 
time from initiatives and strategic actions taken, which led to military leaders focusing on 
the best ways to gain advantage over adversaries. 
 
The New World 
 The Industrial Revolution, which started in Europe and progressed to the new 
world, brought great advancements in weapons, armor, and communications.  A major 
advancement in communications came in the form of the telegraph.  Samuel Morse 
invented the telegraph in 1832 (Montgomery, 1968: 420).  The telegraph provided a 
primary means of communication during the American Civil War.  The telegraph also 
provided an early electronic system that helped with the advancement of military 
communications.  “Although telegraph messages were frequently sent in code, the 
recipients were relying on the integrity of the telegraph companies than on the codes for 
security” (Diffie, 2003).  Even though the early telegraphic systems were not developed 
to protect sent messages, many devices developed automated the message process.  Since 
the telegraph was a primary means of communication, both the Union and Confederate 
Armies tapped lines.  In his book, The Secret War for the Union, Edwin C. Fishel stated 
that even though the telegraph had the potential to yield great intelligence, there are 
records that indicate tapped lines yielded no pertinent information that could be used by 
either side (Fishel, 1996: 4).   
During the American Civil War, intelligence collection obtained by the signal 
corps became a primary means of obtaining enemy information.  Opposing signal corps 
would collect intelligence by observing troop movements using signal towers, rooftops, 
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and hilltops.  Counter measures by both sides often relied on the minimal use of flags, 
which would pinpoint their location or other key operational information (Fishel,1996: 
5).  Such tactics also demonstrate how confidentiality and the protection of sent messages 
was the main reason for the development of certain defensive strategies during the Civil 
War.   
World War I 
 The military importance of the radio and advancements in communication 
technology influenced key decisions in the United States Government during WWI.  On 
April 7, 1917, all amateur and commercial use of radio came to an abrupt halt as the 
United Stated entered into WWI.  Radio stations were ordered to shut down or were taken 
over by the government.  This precautionary measure taken by the United States helped 
to ease the growing concern of an ill-prepared U.S. Military to cope with the 
communication needs generated by entrance into the war (De Gallaix, 1919).  Emergency 
measures adopted during the early stages of the U.S. involvement suggest there were no 
alternative message systems available prior to this time.  According to Diffie (2003), “the 
military radio in wartime was so valuable that no one could completely forgo its use.”  
However, the problem with the radio was its simple use.  From a security standpoint, it 
was easy to send and receive transmissions.  In order to protect radio transmissions, 
military leaders incorporated the use of cryptography as a security measure (Diffie, 
2003).  According to The History of Codes and Ciphers in the United States during WWI, 
four additional factors led to the increased use of codes and ciphers for wartime 
communications (Barker, 1979; 126): 
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• The increasing use of wire communications increased the demand 
for encryption methods to prevent enemy access. 
 
• The invention of the steam and gas engine provided greater 
mobility of military tactics and increased the need for encryption 
methods for communications.  
 
• The invention of the radio and its speedy adoption for military use. 
 
• The invention and development of the aircraft and the speedy 
adaptation for military operations.       
 
One major communications function during WWI focused on maintaining the 
confidentiality of sent messages, which is the fundamental objective of cryptography.  
This objective also has other important applications that focus on the authentication of 
messages and the protection of sent data (Soergel, 2002).  Such techniques rely on the 
notion that there is a message; however, it is difficult for unauthorized persons to read or 
understand it (Joyce, 2002).  Another essential element used in cryptography is 
encryption.  Encryption is the process to encode a message so that the contents are hidden 
to unauthorized individuals (Soergel, 2002).  This encoding process is essential to allow a 
message to be un-readable by unauthorized persons.  Cryptographic systems also use 
ciphers and cipher devices.  The word cipher is Arabic for “nothing” and is a method of 
concealment in which the primary unit, letters of a particular alphabet, are substituted 
with other letters, numbers, or symbols.  A cipher device is a manual mechanism used to 
encrypt and decrypt messages.  A cipher is also method of concealing or keeping secret 
the meaning of a word, phrase, sentence, or longer message in which the basic unit of 
concealment is the letter (Newton, 1997; Wrixon, 1998). 
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The greater need for secure communications became apparent when the American 
Expeditionary Force (AEF) first arrived in Europe.  The AEF’s radio, telephone, and 
courier dispatches urgently needed encryption protection (Wrixon, 1998).  There were 
three cryptographic systems used during high-level communications by the U.S. Army.  
The War Department Telegraph Code 1915, The Army Cipher Disk, and The Playfair 
Cipher were used throughout the early stages of the war despite the notion that they were 
believed to be insecure and unreliable.  However, only the War Department Telegraph 
Code 1915 and the The Playfair Cipher were used in Europe (Barker, 1979; 126-127).  
Since secure communications by encryption was essential to the U.S. Military, leaders 
began to focus on the development of other forms of encrypted communication.  This led 
to the development of several experimental codes by the Code Compilation Sections in 
Washington and France that were evaluated by the Military Intelligence branch of the 
War Department known as MI-8 (Barker, 1979; 33; Wrixon, 1998).  The evaluation of 
the various codes led to the development of two-part codes, which were more 
complicated and provided greater levels of security.  Even though the AEF had limited 
knowledge of cryptographic techniques at the beginning of the American entrance into 
WWI, by late 1918 the U.S. had made significant strides in ciphers and encipherment 
methods. 
During the closing days of WWI, eight Choctaw Indians emerged as key 
communication specialists to the AEF.  During the Mousse-Argonne campaign, the 
Choctaw “code talkers” used their native language to encode key information over open 
radio channels.  Other native Choctaw speakers decoded the messages and conveyed the 
information to AEF company commanders.  Over the course of a few weeks, they 
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handled field telephone calls, translated radio messages, and wrote field orders.  German 
eavesdroppers who had tapped radio and telephone lines and broken American radio 
codes could not interpret the Choctaw language (Green, 1979; Wrixon, 1998; 357).   
 The successful use of the radio throughout WWI allowed communications 
between military units who were considerable distances apart.  However, transmission 
techniques were also vulnerable to interception by the enemy (Churchhouse, 2002; 111).  
Many countries realized that the use of encryption techniques to encipher and decipher 
messages could be used for secure communications in future military operations.  
Consequently, several developments would shape the future of military secure 
communications techniques.   
 During the 1920’s, one of the most famous crypto graphical machines, Enigma, 
was invented by Arthur Scherbius, co-founder of a German engineering firm 
(Churchhouse, 2002; 111).  Prior to Enigma, there were a number of methods used to 
encipher messages.  Such methods were based on the use of books of numerals held only 
by the sender and the recipient.  Each service had its own particular code book with a 
multitude of words and phrases likely to be used by a particular service.  There were 
opposite phrases and words in each numerical group (Winterbothan, 1974; 8)    The 
original Enigma was constructed and shown in Vienna in 1923, however, the machine 
was not adopted for military use until Adolph Hitler began to rearm Germany during the 
late 1920’s.  The German High Command (GHC), with counsel from German 
cryptographic experts, decided that Enigma offered satisfactory guarantees of security 
after several modifications and improvements (Kahn, 1968).  The GHC considered the 
Enigma machine top-secret and the code unbreakable even though the original machine 
 
 29
was shown to the public.  The GHC eventually equipped all branches of the German 
armed forces with the device (Dziewanowski, 2001: Churchhouse, 2002; 132: Haufler, 
1999).  
The Hagelin cipher machine was another important cipher of the late 1920’s.  It 
was developed by Boris Hagelin and manufactured in Sweden.  The Hagelin cipher could 
print and provided greater accuracy than the Enigma machine.  It was marketed to any 
country and was eventually purchased by Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and France under a variety of names including the M209, C36, C38, and 
C41 (Churchhouse, 2002; 133).  By 1942 and continuing into the 1950s, improvements to 
the Hagelin machine were initiated by the American, French, and Italian militaries.  The 
machine was modified for improved performance, reduced in size, and mass produced to 
support individual war efforts by each country (Kahn, 1968; 426-427).   
According to Polish intelligence accounts during the early stages of WWII, 
counterintelligence agents intercepted an Enigma machine dispatched from Berlin to the 
German legation in Warsaw in 1929.  Three years passed before Polish scholars could 
break the secret to the German cipher.  By 1939 and on the eve of the war, the polish 
intelligence service could decode most German messages.  After this accomplishment, 
the Polish made replicas of Enigma available to allied commanders.  They furnished 
machines to French and British intelligence officers (Dziewanowski, 2001).  Obtaining 
and breaking the German cipher would prove significant since the world was on the brink 
of the Second World War.     
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World War II 
The success of the Choctaw code talkers during WWI prompted key military 
leaders to find additional Native Indian speakers for tactical combat communications 
during the early stages of World War II (WWII).  Twenty-five years earlier, there were 
only eight Choctaw code talkers during WWI.  The Choctaw code talkers were 
instrumental in the establishment of other military units composed of other Native Indian 
speakers serving as communications specialists.  The U.S. Army formed a 
communication unit that consisted of seventeen Comanche assigned to the Comanche 
Signal Corps of the Army.   Like the Choctaws before them, they handled field telephone 
calls, translated of radio messages, and used their language with a combination of 
specialty crafted military terms to write field orders for radio transmission that could not 
be understood by the Germans (Wilson, 1997).   Several tribes spoke across enemy lines 
in Africa, Sicily and the South Pacific.  During 1939 to 1945, the Army tapped Hopi, 
Choctaw, Comanche, Kiowa, Winnebago, Seminole, Navajo and Cherokee Americans to 
use their languages to communicate.  Even though such techniques were considered 
secret codes, the Indian tribes were only using their native dialects and not actual codes 
(Dorn, 1973).     
The most recognized of the code talkers were the Navajo.  The Army continued to 
use Native Indian speakers to encode and decode vital battle information.  However, the 
Marine Corps devised a different technique to employ unique Native Indian languages as 
secret codes during WWII.  During the early stages of WWII, the Japanese 
cryptographers had become very efficient at breaking top-secret military codes.  Philip 
Johnston, who had served with U.S. forces in France and had lived on a Navajo 
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reservation as a youth, was convinced the Navajo language could be used a secret code 
against Japanese cryptographers (Molnar, 1997; Wilson, 1997).  According to Carl 
Gorman, one of the original code talkers, “the language was unwritten at the time and 
was based solely on the sounds, which made it difficult for others to understand 
(Bandrapalli, 1997).”  Philip Johnston eventually convinced key Marine Corps leaders of 
the potential of the Navajo language.  The Navajos were the only Native American Tribe 
recruited specifically to be communications specialists.  Over 400 Navajos completed 
Marine Corps boot camp and wartime training at Camp Pendleton’s code talker school.  
The Navajos developed a technique that used native words translated into common 
warfare or battle terms (Dorn, 1973; 7).  Most were assigned to combat units overseas 
and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) recommended that a crew of qualified 
“talkers” be assigned to each Marine Corps Division and the remaining “talkers” to a 
training center in the South Pacific (Dorn, 1973; 60).  Eventually the code became the 
main method of secret radio communications during pivotal battles in the pacific 
(Bandrapalli, 1997; Wilson, 1997).  A staff writer for the Marine Corps Magazine, The 
Leatherneck, commented on the code talkers:   
 “Voice Code transmission of operational orders laid the groundwork from 
the Solomans straight through Okinawa” (Dorn, 1973; 57).                      
It is clear the effort and dedication of the code talkers made significant impacts on the 
pacific operations of the war.  In an interview, Major Howard Conner, the Fifth 
Division’s Signal Officer, described how the Navajo code talkers performed during the 
Iwo Jima landing: 
“The entire operation was directed by the Navajo code….During the two 
days that followed the initial landings I had six Navajo radio nets working 
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around the clock…They sent and received over 800 messages without 
error.  Were it not for the Navajo Code Talkers, the Marines never would 
have taken Iwo Jima” (Wilson, 1997). 
 
The use of the Navajo code became one method of U.S. secret radio communications 
during key battles throughout the pacific theater and was often referred to as “the code 
the Japanese couldn’t crack.”  The unique relationship between the Navy and the Marine 
Corps allowed Navajos based on ships or shore to communicate with each other quickly 
and accurately and prevented the enemy from acquiring early knowledge of future events  
(Dorn, 1973; 58; Bandrapalli, 1997). 
 In addition to the Navajo communicators’ ability to transmit secure messages, 
there were other significant efforts aimed at secure communications technology.  The A-3 
scrambler system operated by the American Telegraph and Telephone (AT&T) Company 
was considered state of the art technology during WWI, however, during the early stages 
of WWII, it was vulnerable to anyone with sophisticated unscrambling capability (Boone 
et al, 2000; Weadon, 2000).  In an effort to control persistent communication problems, 
the U.S. and its allies set out to develop a means to protect their information.  Bell 
Telephone Laboratories, under the direction of A.B. Clark with assistance from British 
mathematician, Alan Turing began to work on “the Green Hornet” which was later 
referred to as SIGSALY (Boone et al, 2000; Weadon, 2000).  SIGSALY provided “pulse 
code modulation”, which is known as the predecessor of present-day innovations as 
digital voice, data, and video transmission.  Additionally, early applications of spread 
spectrum technology were developed.  SIGSALY is a device that helped to provide a 
springboard into the digital communication world.  Formal deployment began and 
provided a great advantage to the U.S. and allies in July 1943 because of its ability to 
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offer truly secure voice communications at high organizational levels (Boone et al, 2000; 
Weadon, 2000).              
The resourcefulness of the allied forces to intercept and decode key 
communications by the German and Japanese diplomatic and military leadership also 
proved vital to the allied war effort.  According to the National Security Agency’s 
Korean War Background of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), cryptanalytic units expanded 
and close ties between the U.S. and Great Britain at the outbreak of WWII facilitated 
their efforts.  Military and civilian decision makers obtained detailed inside information 
about the enemy.  The enhanced activity paid off in plentiful and high-quality 
information on the Germans and Japanese – their location, armament, and intentions 
(Hatch, 2000).  During early stages of WWII, the Germans and Japanese were using 
various adaptations of Enigma for key communications.  Enigma was used to control and 
report locations of submarines in the Atlantic and to pass information about bombing 
raids, the movement of military units, and the location and cargo of military supply ships 
(Adamy, 2003).  Unknown to the Germans, their secret communications weapon had 
been compromised long before the war began.  The Polish success in breaking the secrets 
to Enigma and subsequently using the machine to decode German messages would be 
vital to allied military operations for American, British and French forces.  After an 
arrangement between the British and Polish government, the sharing of the Enigma and 
relevant intelligence was turned over to the British.  The British improved the techniques 
developed by the polish at the Government and Cipher School at Bletchley Park, United 
Kingdom.  The Ultra Secret Intelligence Agency, or “Ultra”, was the result of British 
improvements to Polish methods of deciphering at Bletchley Park.  This technology was 
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later turned over to the American government, who also assigned American military 
personnel to Bletchley Park to work on the “Ultra Secret” (Dziewanowski, 2001; Haufler, 
1999). 
Another major contributor to the code breaking effort of German military 
communications was Bombes.  Designed to replace several time consuming manual 
methods used for the heavy amount of Enigma intercepts, a series of machines known as 
Bombes were created to look for certain sequences of characters and comparisons of 
various Enigma settings (Lee, 2000).  Although the British originally manufactured 
Bombes in Europe, the U.S. Navy led the effort to manufacture enhanced Bombes in the 
U.S. to combat the growing concern for the German U-Boat codes used to coordinate 
attacks on U.S. ships in the Atlantic.  The National Cash Register (NCR) Company in 
Dayton, Ohio was awarded the contract to manufacture Bombes.  The U.S. Bombes were 
far superior to previous versions and allowed cryptologists at Bletchley Park to focus on 
the production of other code breaking requirements (Lee, 2000).               
Even though the information presented above concentrated on the breaking of 
German codes and devices center on offensive tactics, it demonstrated the German lack 
of effective information and information security practices.  The German failure to 
practice procedures that led to a greater focus on the security of communications 
functions would ultimately lead to allied progress towards victory in the Atlantic and 
Pacific.  The efforts made by the U.S. and Great Britain to intercept and break German 
codes would also prove to be decisive to the overall strength of allied militaries.   
The National Security Agency’s Korean War commemoration on signals 
intelligence (SIGINT) summarized that by the closing days of WWII, military personnel 
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wanted to return to their homes and consequently a large number of personnel left 
cryptology for civilian life (Frahm, 2000).  From 1945 until the start of the Korean War, 
President Truman slashed the military budget in an effort to reduce the deficit created by 
the war.  Additionally, only the most critical cryptology positions were filled due to 
deficit reduction efforts and other, more important, U.S. commitments.  Communication 
efforts focused on the Soviet Union, which stemmed from increased tensions of the cold 
war and the fall of China to the communists.  As a result, there were major structural and 
doctrinal changes associated with military communications (Frahm, 2000).  In 1949, all 
three military cryptologic services were centralized under the new Armed Forces Security 
Agency (AFSA).  In addition, the Army Security Agency (ASA) and the Air Force 
Security Service (AFSS) also played important roles to the overall communications 
posture of the pre Korea timeframe (Weadon, 2000).   
 
Korea 
 On June 25, 1950, in an effort to reunify the Korean peninsula under communist 
rule, the North Koreans launched a massive offensive led by 150 soviet tanks against 
South Korea.  Within days, the Capital of Seoul was captured and there was a steady push 
further south (Frahm, 2000).  Prior to the North Korean offensive, the U.S. Government 
characterized Korean communication activities as a low-level priority.  Intercept 
activities and limited cryptographic support in the region centered on the monitoring of 
Soviet and Chinese communist activities.  Even though there were several intercepts prior 
to the beginning of the war, coverage was dropped once analysts confirmed the non-
Soviet origin of the material.  Major efforts focused on Communications Intelligence 
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(COMINT) which centered on the ability of U.S. Forces to conduct communications 
intercept activities in support potential offensive operations (Hatch, 2000: Johnson, 2000; 
39).  According to an assessment of the Korean War conducted by Thomas Johnson 
(2000), “the Korean War occurred during a period of struggle in the cryptographic 
community.  It began a year after the formation of the AFSA and concluded after the 
AFSA ship had been scuttled in favor of a new vessel, the National Security Agency.” 
 As with WWI and WWII, the U.S. was ill prepared to cope with many of the 
communications challenges faced during the early stages of the Korean War.  In fact, 
even though WWII had concluded five years earlier, various stages of the war in Korea 
produced a resurrection of WWII communication standards, guidelines, and common 
practices, including American strategic level communications (Hatch, 2000).  The 
dependable SIGABA device, developed from the earlier SIGSALY device, and tools 
such as the M-209, secure communications continued to keep American plans and 
intentions from the enemy.  Many believe that the SIGABA was the most secure 
cryptosystem of its era and that no SIGABA traffic or battlefield communications were 
read during the latter stages of WWII or Korea (Diffie, 2003; Weadon, 2000).    
Most of the U.S. communications strategies focused on maintaining a steady flow of 
enemy intelligence and security concerns aimed at protection of information and 
personnel.    In personal interviews conducted by John G. Westover with members of the 
United States Army who served during the Korean conflict, there is a clear indication that 
certain factors contributed to the security of information.  Many of these factors relate to 
the four dimensions of IA; information states, information characteristics, security 
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countermeasures, and time discussed earlier.  Several of these personal accounts are 
provided below (Westover, 1987; 87-106):  
 
• LtCol. George Lieberberg, Signal Section, HQ Eighth Army.   
“Since there was no anticipation of this war and the U.S. priorities 
were concentrated elsewhere, military personnel staffing to the 
region was a major concern.  The first order was to dispatch troops 
with communications specialties from Japanese region to the 
Korean.”  
 
• Capt. John W. Pierce, 24th Signal Company.  “Although wire is the 
primary method of signal communications, in Korea we had to use 
very high frequency (VHF) radio because distance, speed, terrain, 
and road nets limited the use of wire.”  “The isolation of the VHF 
terminals was a major concern….The isolation of the U.S Forces 
also brought a serious security problem.  With no headquarters 
personnel nearby to provide security, we sometimes requested help 
from the Korean National Police.  I did not have much faith in the 
personnel of this force, and in some cases it was better to use our 
signalmen as guards.”    
 
• Capt. Frank D. Secan, 304th Signal Operation Battalion.  “In 
teaching about VHF radio, instructors often place more emphasis 
on the difficulties of line-of-sight than is necessary.  VHF waves 
bend, bounce, and do many other tricks.  I have aimed such waves 
up valleys, through mountain passes, and once directed my beam 
directly at a large mountain – yet had the signal clearly received.”  
“I have seen a number of VHF stations located on the crests of 
hills and mountains to take advantage of line-of-sight.  On the 
slope you can get out of the wind, with its consequent technical 
troubles and personal discomforts much easier.” 
 
• Capt. Wayne A. Striley, 71st Signal Service Battalion.  “The 
destruction of signal equipment was greater in Korea that in 
WWII.”  “The key cable used for Korea’s telephone-telegraph 
system was in pretty bad condition from bomb explosions, 
artillery, and mortar fire.” 
 
• SFC Richard L. Albrecht, Headquarters, 24th Division Artillery.  
“In their enthusiasm to get messages delivered, a number of 
message centers sent communications by several methods.  All 
classified messages – even those labeled Restricted – had to be 
encoded before they could be transmitted by radio.  It always 
 
 38
seemed we got our coded messages at night.  It was normal most 
evenings fo the code clerk to work several hours on messages, only 
to find that the same messages had already been received by 
courier and distributed.”        
 
• Lt. Arthur J. Cramer, 7th Signal Company.  “The entire 
cryptography system is cumbersome under the best conditions, but 
it is intolerable when it is not working properly.  Typical of the 
conditions that slow up the system were the over-classified 
messages.  We received so many five day old Flash (highest 
priority) messages from X corps that they became a joke.”  “Our 
cryptographers were overburdened with long messages that were 
also forwarded by some other (and often faster) method.  Many 
times at night I would awaken my whole crew to get them working 
on a number of long messages – only to find they had previously 
been received by telephone in the clear, or had been brought by 
courier.” 
 
• From Signal, November-December 1951.  “Carrying messages by 
plane is nothing new, but in Korea it has become important.  Jeep, 
or motor messenger service, had always received more use until 
the Korean campaign made getting messages from one battlefield 
to another more difficult.”  “The airplane performs an important 
job which is as old as warfare:  getting the message through.” “The 
answer to the bad roads was the light airplane, the L-5, or 
“mosquito”.”   
 
As acknowledged in the personal accounts above, U.S. forces persevered under extreme 
conditions to ensure the protection of information and information systems during the 
Korean War.  Key concepts of these  personal accounts demonstrate how poor staffing, 
difficult and unfamiliar terrain, redundant practices, inexperience, and various other 
factors led to innovations and practices that evolved into vital concepts that align with the 
four dimensions of IA discussed by Maconachy (2001). 
 Another factor that affected the security of information was press releases that 
provided too much information on the exploitation of enemy communications.  To limit 
such activities, military leadership implemented drastic measures such as suspending 
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COMINT operational support to battlefield commanders until key security concerns were 
alleviated (Johnson, 2000: 56). 
 COMSEC during the Korean War demonstrated a fluid tactical situation during 
the early stages of the fighting.  This led to the destruction of high-level machine ciphers 
to prevent their capture (Finnegan, 1998: 114).  Other COMSEC vulnerabilities centered 
on the general lack of a vigilance and awareness by service members, which increased 
the number of security violations.  These violations were normally taken lightly due to 
more important problems like the general speed and availability of communications for 
the war fighter (Finnegan, 1998; 150).   
 The closing stages of the Korean war saw changes in national security policies 
and overall defensive management structures that aligned with the new Presidential 
administration and a general dissatisfaction of the American public.  This dilemma 
centered on recently ended fighting with the signing of the Korean armistice in 1953.  As 
with the previous wars, military personnel levels were reduced in favor of “lean” forces.  
Additionally, the concentration on warfighting capabilities that included tactical nuclear 
weapons led to various revamping strategies focusing on the Soviet threat (Fennigan, 
1998: 122).  
 Other developments during the 1950s included the Army Security Agency’s 
(ASA) awareness of possible security concerns stemming from emissions of electronic 
data processing equipment.  The ASA initiated a program named TEMPEST.  The 
function of TEMPEST related concepts center on compromising emanations generated by 
electromagnetic radiation, which interferes with radiation and could possibly leak 
information about the data being processed on an unprotected machine (Kuhn, 1998).  To 
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counter the threat posed by TEMPEST and other security concerns, the ASA formed 
boards to provide long range planning and research into programs that would counter the 
threat to electronic data processing equipment that might compromise security (Fennigan, 
1988; 129). 
 
Vietnam 
As with previous wars, the period leading up to the Vietnam War provided the 
opportunity of the American leadership to establish programs that would focus on 
restructuring and reallocating personnel and resources to other, more important missions 
(Fennigan, 1998: 121).  During the early stages of the Vietnam War, ASA companies 
provided communications support for tactical units throughout Vietnam.  Initially, such 
practices were aligned with police type functions of monitoring friendly communications 
and warning of possible compromises.  Many military personnel also assumed that the 
enemy was unsophisticated and that communications security did not warrant much 
concern (Myer, 1982: 64).  Early policies were determined to be ineffective and time 
consuming to implement.  Consequently, the ASA developed a new concept of “before 
the fact” assistance by having personnel serve as advisers rather than police officers.  
This new function emphasized the importance of planning operational communications 
procedures and the absolute necessity of communications security (Fennegan, 1998: 152).  
Basic techniques included changing call signs and frequencies and using codes for map 
coordinates.  However, such techniques proved to be cumbersome and controversial due 
in part to the confusion of changes involving call signs and naming functions that were 
derogatory or degrading to U.S. Forces in the theater of operations (Myer, 1982: 65).             
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According to documentation compiled by Major General Joseph McChristian 
(1974) in his book, Vietnam Studies:  The role of Military Intelligence 1965-1967: 
“The need for an accurate system to account for the large number of 
classified documents was a primary concern since the security of 
information was the focal point for the significant intelligence effort in the 
Republic of Vietnam.”   
 
Many initiatives and directives spawned from the security concerns during the Vietnam 
conflict.  After the Counterintelligence division conducted command wide inventories of 
all classified material, it was determined there was a need to reduce the amount of 
classified material stored to decrease the likelihood of compromises.     
The United States Military Assistance Command’s (MAC) security policies and 
procedures provided key information on classified material that included the following:   
• Number of classified documents  
o on hand at the beginning of the reporting period 
o on hand as the end of the reporting period 
• Number of new documents generated 
• Number destroyed 
• Number dispatched 
• Number downgraded.   
Additionally, security control officers were trained to supervise overall security measures 
and practices and stress the importance of continuous security education (McChristian, 
1974: 143).  Even though the MAC established several policies and regulations 
governing COMSEC, many commanders disregarded the regulations and chose to 
sacrifice security considerations for speed and availability of communications.  Such 
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decisions were much easier since satisfactory COMSEC often produced paralyzing 
confusion and an overall displeasure.    
 The establishment of Army Regulations 380-5, Safeguarding Defense 
Information, significantly improved the information security (INFOSEC) posture, which 
is the basis for the Command Information Security Program.  In the early stages of this 
initiative, several instances revealed the lack of attention to detail, however, as the 
inspections became rapid, widespread improvements indicated that overall security 
training, education, and awareness increased command interest and helped to limit 
security violations and inconsistencies (McChristian, 1974: 145).  This regulation and 
other initiatives provided an efficient security posture throughout the remainder of the 
conflict: 
• Announced and unannounced inspections revealed inattention to basic 
security.  
 
• Inspections and surveys improved the security posture of commands. 
 
• Restrictive services served to remind all personnel of their security 
responsibility. 
 
• Directives outlining the specific requirements for a security program. 
 
• Full favorable personnel security investigations for Vietnamese 
applicants prior to employment in administrative, logistical, and 
custodial positions. 
 
• Modified storage requirements to fit the capabilities of tactical units 
and advisory teams. 
 
• Documents clearly marked with security classifications. 
 
• The establishment of a “common need” for personnel access to 
sensitive data.  
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Other security devices enhanced the overall posture of the U.S. Military during the 
conflict.  A key development was the implementation of the NESTOR family of 
narrowband secure voice equipment.  Some devices included in the NESTOR family 
were, the KY-8 (Stationery Vehicle Use); KY-28 (Aircraft Use); and the KY-38 
(Manpack or Mobile Use).  Other devices, aimed at the mobility of military personnel, 
were the PRC-77 and VRC-12 used in combination with the KY-38 (Myer, 1982: 68-70).    
In addition to the establishment of key INFOSEC regulations, the Vietnam 
Conflict brought major policy initiatives governing COMSEC.  During the early stages of 
the war, COMSEC was a police-type function aimed at monitoring friendly 
communications and warning of possible compromises.  This “after the fact” 
management of communication resources proved inefficient and at times, costly to 
military operations various activities.  After such vulnerabilities were identified, the ASA 
progressed to a system that concentrated on “before the fact” assistance that led to the 
establishment of operational communications procedures and iterating the importance of 
COMSEC to military organizations (Finnegan, 1998; 152).  During March 1970, the 
Military Assistance Command compiled a series of lessons learned outlining key issues 
effecting American Military units in Vietnam.  According to Vietnam Lessons Learned 
Number 79: Enemy exploitation of tactical communication (USMAC, 1970), there were 
several problems with COMSEC: 
“The continuous employment of unauthorized codes, lack of proper 
communication discipline, and disregard of existing regulations, directives 
and specified procedures continue to provide the enemy with valuable and 
extremely timely intelligence information…..continued disregard for 
approved codes is constantly providing the enemy with timely intelligence 
which can be exploited for foil allied operations.”  
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It is evident from the information provided from lessons learned documentation that more 
regulations with a greater emphasis was needed for “sound and secure communication 
techniques that strictly adhered to new and existing regulations” (USMAC, 1970).   
The closing stages of Vietnam in 1973 occurred during the same time as the 
explosion of technologies related to the Internet, networking, and security become 
prevalent throughout the U.S.  The significance of such events will continue to influence 
technological changes for the future and serve as a catalyst for military warfare.  As the 
Internet became a catalyst for distributed systems, so did the need for greater security of 
information and information systems.  The early history of the Internet highlights how 
increased use of Internet led to the identification of vulnerabilities discovered during 
events that could be considered unintentional acts that led to the identification of major 
concerns.           
 
The History of the Internet   
Although the U.S. Government was responsible for creating the predecessor to 
today’s internet, it was not originally designed to transfer information critical to U.S. 
national security (Beauregard, 2001).  However, today’s internet is used for a seemingly 
infinite number of purposes, including key military communications and operations that 
enable the U.S. Military to maintain the highest level of combat readiness.  Although 
internet related technology has changed how warfare is conducted, the use of information 
in war has been a basic warfighting requirement throughout history (Gumahad, 1997).   
The history of the Internet provides an explanation of how IA programs evolved 
from necessary security measures taken by organizations.  The Department of Defense 
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(DOD) is an organization that heavily relies on the Internet to conduct modern 
information operations.  The protection and defense of information and information 
systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, identification, confidentiality, and non-
repudiation was not a direct result of a single initiative but a continuous iteration of 
smaller -- individual efforts directed towards increased performance and efficiency 
systems we now know as the Internet.  The Internet evolved over a very short period to 
become one of the most important systems available for military use.  Even though 
modern IO is information and Internet intensive, early IO programs also focused on the 
protection of information from the enemy.  This newer requirement will still focus on the 
core concept of protection. 
The first signs of the need for increased protection and defense were not so 
obvious during the creation of the Internet in 1969.  It began as the ARPANET, a major 
government and academic research institute in the United States funded by the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the U. S. Department of Defense (Hurd, 2001; 
Longstaff, 1997).  The original goal was to create a network that would continue to 
function even if major sections of the network failed.  Longstaff and others identified this 
concept as the rerouting of network traffic automatically around problems in connecting 
systems or in passing along necessary information.  Such efforts were only seen as 
network openness and flexibility, which provided optimal services and performance to 
the small group of users.    
As the affordable personal computer became available with the advent of smaller, 
more powerful computers, the 1980s saw an explosion in computer use by the average 
person (Hurd, 2001).  In 1986, Cliff Stoll identified the first well-publicized international 
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security incident related to the Internet in his book, The Cuckoo’s Egg.  He identified an 
accounting error, which led him to uncover an international effort to exploit university 
and government computers by accessing and copying information from them (Stoll, 
1989).  According to Longstaff et al (1997), Stoll was the first to raise awareness to 
potential problems by identifying key ARPANET vulnerabilities that could be used for 
destructive purposes.        
In 1988, Robert T. Morris, then a student at Cornell University, wrote a program 
that would connect to one computer another; find and use one of several vulnerabilities to 
copy itself to a second computer; and begin to run the copy of itself at the new location.  
A “worm” is the name of a computer program that automatically copies and replicates 
itself.  Experts identified the Morris Worm was as the first automated network security 
incident against the ARPANET.  The ARPANET extended to over 88,000 computers and 
was the primary means of communication among government network computer experts 
at the time of the incident.  With the ARPANET effectively down, it was difficult to 
coordinate a response to the problem (Longstaff, 1997).       
The network grew extensively over a short period and was vital to the daily 
operations of the ARPANET.  It was important to find a way to prevent security disasters 
from occurring in the future.  The solution was the creation of the Computer Emergency 
Response Team (CERT) coordination center to respond to network emergencies (Zakon, 
2000).  Today, CERT teams are widely known throughout the computer security world.  
Various teams from branches of the military coordinate responses to computer security 
incidents, assist sites in handling attacks, and educate network users about computer 
security threats and preventive practices.   
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The ARPANET officially became the Internet, the concept of a worldwide 
network of computers sharing information.  It moved from a government research project 
to an operational network with over 100,000 computers in 1989 (Hurd, 2001; Zakon, 
2000).  Such rapid growth also led to more security incidents and new opportunities for 
additional network attacks.  The growth of the internet prompted users to take a closer 
look at various security incidents and network attacks.  Since the internet had become so 
valuable, it was necessary to take greater precautions to protect resources.  The protection 
of resources was also a major problem since the many early network protocols that 
formed part of the internet infrastructure were designed without security in mind 
(Longstaff, 2000).  This overall design made it difficult to manage various security 
aspects.      
 
Security of the Internet and Information Systems  
 The exponential growth in internet security incidents from 1988 to 1995 
demonstrates the importance of protecting the internet and information systems.  
According to experts, there are six reasons why the internet is vulnerable (Longstaff, 
2000):  
• Early network protocols designed without security in mind. 
• Openness of the internet allows attacks to be quick, inexpensive and 
un-detectable.        
      
• Sites have unwarranted trust and are unaware of the risks. 
• Rapid development of internet related services and applications. 
• Operating system security not considered at purchasing. 
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• Explosive growth has expanded the need for well-trained and 
experienced managers.  
The six reasons identified above have caused organizations to take a closer look at the 
security of their systems.  Figure 4 shows growth of the number of network security 
incidents from 1988 to 1995.  The facts presented give justification for greater security 
measures of information and information systems.      
 
Figure 4:  Security Incidents.  1988-1995 (CERT/CC, 2000) 
 
This figure begins with the year 1988 and related data did not exist before this time.  The 
protection of information in warfare has always been a key aspect of U.S. Military 
operations even though pertinent data related to the Internet is only available since 1988. 
The military currently uses the internet for an infinite number of purposes.  As 
Internet and Internet related technologies continue to revolutionize military operations, 
there are certain concepts developed over time that necessitate understanding of key 
warfare elements and the importance of protecting vital information and systems.  
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Because of this rapid growth, this necessity will further validate the importance of 
protecting pertinent information used for such purposes in the future.   
 
Information Assurance Strategy  
 According to the Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) on Information 
Operations, IA is a subcategory of the Information Warfare (IW) under the Counter 
Information domain.  The sub-domains of Offensive Counter Information (OCI) and 
Defensive Counter Information (DCI) form the nucleus of attack and defend operations 
performed during warfare.  A recent research effort described this relationship:   
“Information Superiority gives the U.S. the ability to control information 
even on an insecure network such as the Internet.  Since Information 
Superiority cannot be obtained and maintained without Information 
Assurance, to control the Information Operations spectrum the military 
must have the ability to protect its own information, detect any 
unauthorized intrusions, and react to those intrusions in a timely manner 
(Beauregard, 2001).”   
 
OCI and DCI tactics, techniques, and procedures ensure significant advantage 
over adversaries and help to achieve military objectives aimed at IS (AFDD-1, 
1998: 3).  These two counter information categories, OCI and DCI, also exist 
simultaneously by protecting against potential vulnerabilities and exploiting the 
enemy’s vulnerabilities. 
 IA focuses strictly on DCI tactics, techniques, and procedures that ensure 
protection, detection, and reaction to potential problems.  The current IA structure 
makes the goal of information superiority easier to achieve.  Although there are 
several other concepts represented under the DCI category, this research effort 
only focuses on the elements associated with IA since it is viewed as the 
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foundation of any defensive strategy for the protection of information and 
information systems (AFDD-1, 1998: 3).    
 
Figure 5:  Air Force Information Superiority Construct (AFDD-1, 1998: 3) 
 
 
The origins of the current IA structure and overall concept are embedded in earlier 
defensive strategies such as communications security (COMSEC) and information 
security (INFOSEC).  According to the United States Marine Corps Institute’s (USMCI) 
correspondence course on COMSEC (1998), it is a reversible weapon: 
“We will not win battles, unless our forces receive and preserve vital 
intelligence.  We also cannot win battles, if the enemy receives this 
intelligence as readily as we do.  Communications security, therefore, is an 
integral part of reliable communications which may prove to be the key to 
victory on the modern battlefield.”  
 
COMSEC is that protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized 
persons information of value from the study of communications.  Essentially, the primary 
Information Superiority
Information Operations 
Counter Information  
Information Warfare Information-In-Warfare 
ISR 
Weather 
Navigation & Positioning 
Other Information Collection 
Dissemination Activities 
PSYOP 
Electronic Warfare 
Military Deception 
Physical Attack 
Information Attack 
Information Assurance 
OPSEC 
Counter Intelligence 
Counter PSYOP 
Electronic Protection 
Counter Deception 
     Attack             Defend Gain                   Exploit 
Defensive 
Counter Information 
Offensive 
Counter Information
 
 51
purpose of COMSEC is to deny unauthorized persons or to protect valuable information  
obtained from studying communications.  COMSEC is resultant of the need for military 
commanders to safeguard information during conflicts.  Primarily, the U.S. Military has 
streamlined such concepts to achieve a certain level of reliable and secure 
communications.  A balanced approach to the theory of COMSEC has four essential 
components of COMSEC: transmission security, physical security, cryptographic 
security, and emission security (USMCI, 1998). 
• Transmission security is the protection of all transmissions and denial 
or reduction of the effectiveness of interception, traffic analysis, 
imitative deception, and radio direction finding.  
 
• Physical security is the protection of classified communications 
equipment and material from unauthorized personnel. 
 
• Cryptographic security is development and use of technically sound 
cryptosystems, and the application of proper crypto techniques. 
 
• Emission security involves measures taken to deny unauthorized 
persons information of value that might be obtained from interception 
and analysis of compromising emanations from cryptographic and 
telecommunications systems. 
 
The four components of COMSEC contribute to the protection of various systems, which 
is essential to IA concepts of confidentiality and integrity discussed in chapter one.  
INFOSEC or information systems security is the protection of information 
systems against unauthorized access to or modification of information.  This protection 
takes place against the denial of service to authorized users, whether in storage, 
processing or transit (Maconachy, Schou, and Welch, 2001).  According to the approach 
taken by the authors, this historical definition of INFOSEC lacks stability as a stand alone 
concept under the current IA structure.  Maconachy et al (2001) argued that INFOSEC 
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was an attempt to integrate separate disciplines like personal security, computer security 
and communications security into a coherent identifiable profession.   Since INFOSEC 
primarily focuses on the protection of information and information systems from 
modification or disruptions in accessibility, it cannot support the larger spectrum of 
separate disciplines as originally intended.  According to McCumber (1998), “even 
though COMSEC and INFOSEC provide system security support, merely combining 
these disciplines under an umbrella of common management will fail to capture an 
accurate view of this evolving technology.”  He advocated an approach that emphasizes 
the cornerstone of information systems security, information, and the technology that 
facilitates it. 
Maconachy et al (2001), argued that the evolution of IA and the inception of the 
IA model began during the 1960’s and progressed with the escalation of the information 
intensive environment of the late 1960’s and beyond.  There is clear evidence that 
demonstrates how many concepts of IA are present in the earliest military conflicts.  
Other examples demonstrate how information and information systems protection 
evolved during various military conflicts throughout American History.  The information 
provided below will explore how IA approaches have origins in military conflicts from 
WWI through Vietnam. 
 
Information Assurance Evolutionary Model Development   
Applying the NSA IAM baseline categories to information presented earlier will 
assist in the development the overall plan to categorize concepts of the current 
evolutionary framework of IA.  Additionally, the identification of key aspects of 
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Information States and Security Counter Measures previously explained by the 
McCumber IA model will influence the value obtained from the historical information.  I 
will categorize previous technological mechanisms discovered from WWI through 
Vietnam to the present using the information states, security countermeasures, and the 
examples that correspond to each.  According to Maconachy’s theory and the NSA IAM 
baseline classification system, this categorization must also take place across the 
temporal domain.  This explained by the forth dimension, as the forth dimension, time 
explains.  Table 3, shows the temporal domain along with the IA model dimensions and 
the NSA IAM categories.  This table will demonstrate early examples of information and 
information systems protection mechanisms during warfare.    
Table 3:  IA Evolution Model Core Elements 
IA Model Dimensions 
WWI, WWII, Korea, 
Vietnam 
NSA IAM Baseline 
Categories 
Information States   
Transmission External Connectivity 
Storage Back-Ups Disposal 
Processing Auditing Session Controls 
Security Counter Measures   
Technology 
Maintenance 
Telecommunications 
Virus Protection 
Policies and Practices 
Account Management 
Configuration Management 
Contingency Planning 
IA Documentation 
IA Roles & Responsibilities 
Media Sanitization 
People 
 
-----------Time ------------ 
 
 
 
 
Early Examples of  
Information  
and  
Information Systems  
Protection Mechanisms 
During Warfare 
 
 
 
 
 
-----------Time ------------ 
 
Awareness 
Personnel Security 
Physical Security 
Training 
 
 
 54
In addition to the three dimensions provided above, the representation of the 
security services dimension will address which of the five pillars; availability, 
authentication, confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation are more prevalent under 
each of the four wars.  This dimension, along with indicators for IA in each war, is added 
after each category is presented across the temporal domain and during the final analysis 
of this research.    
 
Justification  
Temporal piece, developed from the Maconachy model and the NSA IAM, 
focuses on the period from WWI to Vietnam and those IA concepts common during 
military operations.  Looking at the six stages of MIS historical research (McKenny, 
1997) from chapter two, a crisis always ensued, which led to innovations and 
improvements in key areas.  Wartime operations, or crisis and conflict, enhances the 
significance of overall war plans.  This is the time when lessons learned and doctrinal 
changes are organized and the production working documents form key organizational 
changes.  This notion is confirmed by the information contained in JP 3-13 (1998) on the 
IO function provided in chapter one.  JP 3-13 demonstrated how IA was the only element 
of IO represented across the entire spectrum from peace, to crisis, to conflict, and to 
peace again with crisis and conflict being the critical timeframe.           
 
Assumptions 
The mapping of the baseline categories and the items listed under the Maconachy 
IA model under the proposed IA framework could fall into simultaneous areas or could 
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be defined differently in various literature depending on the specific criteria used.  It is 
important to establish guidelines and focus on a common or major function and not by 
how each concept is implemented.  The focus of this effort concentrated on the major 
functions of each concept to determine where each would fit in the development of the 
evolutionary model.  The definitions of each dimension by Maconachy provided a 
general guideline for conducting a thorough categorization and will be used to formulate 
the various concepts of the evolutionary model explained below.     
 
Approach to Model 
Various lessons learned during warfare were attempts to outline actions taken to 
reduce the likelihood of security incidents linked to various leadership functions.  The 
notion of speed or convenience versus security or inconvenience was a major issue.  IA 
related concepts have been at the forefront of military operations during warfare.  
Operations are shaped by doctrinal changes that take place during and after a specific 
crises and outlined in lessons learned reports.  Prior to additional classifications from the 
Maconachy model and the NSA IAM baseline, I will categorize previous technological 
mechanisms discovered from during the specific time frame covered using the 
information states and security counter measures dimensions.    
The proposed model will provide discussion according to the sub-categories.  
Such a classification using the temporal domain will attempt to tie each of the wars with 
the four dimensions.  Preceding each category discussion, I will provide a row vector of 
Maconachy IA model dimensions including the temporal addition and the segmentation 
of the pertinent details according to the NSA IAM - IA map. 
 
 56
 
Information States 
 
The transmission state progressed steadily from a very basic function during 
WWI and WWII into a much more robust function during Korea and Vietnam. The 
primary theme was to provide accurate information to key entities in a timely and 
accurate manner.  The radio was widely known as the sole source of electronic 
communications. The significance of the radio throughout the periods covered can be 
demonstrated by the wide use and the innovations to radio related technology over time.  
Table 4 demonstrates the transmission element across the temporal domain.                                                     
Table 4:  Transmission Element 
  World War I World War II Korea Vietnam Baseline  
Transmission 
Courier Dispatch 
Radio 
Tactical 
Telephone 
Telegraph 
Couriers 
Radio 
Tactical 
Telephone 
Telegraph 
Couriers 
Message Centers 
HF Radio 
Telephone 
Message Centers 
VHF Radio (FM)  
Telephone 
External 
Connectivity 
 
The storage element continued to progress by gradually growing more streamlined with 
the introduction of new technologies to accommodate various changes over time.  The 
storage dimension focuses on maintaining control and protecting an uninterrupted flow of 
information by keeping original copies in safe places (Maconachy, 2001).  Early on, this 
process was manual and relied on the human element to provide system protection and 
availability.  During Korea, a more progressive filing system and microfiche technology 
was developed and provided greater levels of security previously unavailable. Table 5 
demonstrates the storage element across the temporal domain.  
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Table 5:  Storage Element 
  World War I World War II Korea Vietnam Baseline  
Storage Manual Archive   - Locally 
Manual Archive 
  - File System 
Dev. 
Microfiche 
  - Systemized 
Archive 
  - Formal 
Retrieval 
    System 
Developed 
Centralized 
Storage Fac. 
Magnetic Tape 
Paper Tape 
Back-Ups 
Disposal 
 
The processing element focuses on how information and information systems are 
protected during the preparation or interpretation stages (Maconachy, 2001).  Coding and 
decoding expertise provided a primary means of  processing various information.  Even 
though coding and decoding provides either manual of automated functions, key elements 
focused on continuous improvement.  The processing function has continued to be a key 
concern for military leadership, as demonstrated by examples taken from WWI and 
WWII.  Later developments if this element focused on providing automated processes 
and centralized locations to conduct operations.  Table 6 demonstrates the processing 
element across the temporal domain. 
Table 6:  Processing Element 
  World War I World War II Korea Vietnam Baseline  
Processing 
Choctaw Talkers 
Manual-
coding/decoding 
Navajo Talkers 
Indian Talkers 
Manual -  
coding/decoding 
Message Centers 
Semi-Automated - 
coding/decoding 
Centralized - 
Message 
Processing 
Automated -  
coding/decoding 
Auditing 
Session Controls 
 
Security Counter Measures 
 
The technology element includes many of the cryptographic systems of the past, 
which provided key advantages to both enemy and friendly combatants during warfare 
(Maconachy, 2001).    During WWII, the U.S. military developed technologies and 
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improved on others developed elsewhere.  Many of these technological advancements 
developed during WWII carried over to the Korean War.  The Vietnam War also 
provided advancements in technology that led to internet related hardware and software 
developments.  Table 7 demonstrates the technology element across the temporal domain.   
Table 7:  Technology Element 
  World War I World War II Korea Vietnam Baseline  
Technology Scramblers   - Shift Ciphers 
Enigma 
Hagelin 
Ultra 
Bombes 
Purple 
SIGSALY 
M-209 
SIGSALY 
M-209 
SIAGBA 
NESTOR (Secure 
Voice) 
  - KY-8 
  - KY-28 
  - KY-38 
  - PRC-77 
Transistors 
Maintenance 
Telecommunicati
ons 
Virus Protection 
 
The policies and practices element incorporates established procedures and concepts 
mandated by organizational leadership.  This element continued to progress throughout 
American warfare and certain indicators demonstrate how prevalent certain concepts 
became as various wars progressed.  Table 8 demonstrates the policies and practices 
element across the temporal domain. 
Table 8:  Policies and Practices Element 
  World War I World War II Korea Vietnam Baseline  
Policies 
  
and  
 
Practices 
Encryption 
Code Books 
Code Books 
COMINT 
Encryption 
SIGINT 
Code Books 
COMINT 
Encryption 
INFO-OPS 
  - Press Releases      
SIGINT 
COMINT 
COMSEC 
Encryption 
INFOSEC 
Information 
Operations 
  - Press Releases 
  - Pol Pressure 
Press Releases 
OPSEC 
Security Policies 
  - Encryption 
  - Documents 
SIGINT 
TEMPEST 
Account 
Management 
Configuration 
Management 
Contingency 
Planning 
IA Documentation
IA Roles & 
Responsibilities 
Media Sanitization 
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The people element evolved from a decentralized structure to a more centralized one over 
time.  The perception that people required awareness, literacy, training, and education  
led to a more centralized structure.  As the need for greater role by communications 
leaders, so did the need for more structure governed by rules and regulations.  Table 9 
demonstrates the people element across the temporal domain. 
Table 9:  People Element 
  World War I World War II Korea Vietnam Baseline  
People No Structure Decentralized 
Decentralized 
Specialized  
Upper - Echelons 
Centralized 
Training 
Programs 
Awareness 
Functions 
Highly 
Centralized 
High Level 
Training 
Compliance -
Enforcement 
Awareness 
Personnel 
Security 
Physical Security 
Training 
 
 
Security Services 
 
The security services dimension focuses on the five key aspects of IA.  Using the 
terms as defined earlier by this research effort, I categorized each by mapping the 
definition with the relevant examples provided throughout the information states and the 
security counter measures dimensions.  An overall categorization that focuses on the key 
concepts identified throughout the proposed evolutionary framework.  Indicators 
demonstrate that across the temporal domain, pertinent details of the current IA structure 
increased through time and led to the current structure of IA.   
Table 10:  Security Services Dimension 
  World War I World War II Korea Vietnam Current  
Security 
Services 
 
 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
 
 
 
 
Availability 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
 
 
 
 
Availability 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
 
 
 
 
Authentication 
Availability 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
 
 
 
Authentication 
Availability 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Non-Repudiation 
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Chapter Overview 
This chapter discussed current literature on the historical perspectives of warfare 
and the protection of information from World War I forward.  This chapter also 
summarized background information pertinent to Information Operations (IO) strategies 
related to aspects of DCI and the IA domain as well as a brief history of the Internet and 
how advancements in networking technologies led to IA principles and practices.  
Finally, this chapter discussed the information assurance evolutionary process and its 
relationship to the warfare perspectives over time.  
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IV. Analysis 
  
Introduction  
The previous chapter explored current literature on the historical perspectives of 
warfare and the protection of information from World War I forward and summarized 
background information pertinent to Information Operations (IO) strategies related to 
aspects of Defensive Counter Information and the Information Assurance (IA) domain.  
This chapter will discuss the findings of this research effort by answering the research 
questions presented in chapter one. 
 
Analysis of Historical Factors 
 Historical research takes into account past occurrences and their significant 
contribution to present and future events.  Within the context of this research effort, past 
occurrences are examined to answer various questions proposed earlier.  The following 
section will include information from previous chapters covering core elements of the 
evolutionary process.   
 
Research Question One 
 
The first research question asks, “What key programs were established to protect 
information and information systems in the U.S. Military from WWI through Vietnam to 
the present?”  In order to answer this question, I analyzed pertinent documentation from 
each U.S. Military conflict since WWI.  My research confirmed there were several 
programs established to protect information and information systems.  Many served 
specific operational purposes.  For example, several security devices of the Vietnam War 
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such as the Integrated Wideband Communications System addressed the need for high 
quality communications systems for high-speed data requirements.  Other enhancements 
focused on the goal of increasing mobility of the war fighter while also increasing 
information security related functions (Rienzi, 1972).   
The two main programs established to protect information and information 
systems were COMSEC and INFOSEC (McCumber, 2001).  COMSEC is protection 
resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value 
that is obtained from studying communications.  Essentially, the primary purpose of 
COMSEC is to deny unauthorized persons or to protect valuable information obtained by 
using four essential security components; transmission security, physical security, 
cryptographic security, and emission security (USMCI, 1998).  Even though the four 
essential components of COMSEC primarily deal with technical requirements, policies 
and practices established under this realm provide key functional areas by which detailed 
security plans were developed.     
 INFOSEC is the protection of information systems against unauthorized access to 
or modification of information, whether in storage, processing or transit and against the 
denial of service to authorized users.  It also includes those measures necessary to detect, 
document, and counter threats. (Maconachy, 2001).  INFOSEC focuses on the 
Information State dimensions discussed in the Maconachy IA model.  This model 
provides justification that information resides in one or more of the three states at any 
given time.  This is further validated by the evolutionary process examples identified 
during the military conflicts from WWI to Vietnam discussed in Chapter Three.         
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Research Question Two 
 
 The second research question asks, “What is an appropriate evolutionary model of 
IA given military operations from WWI through Vietnam to the present?”  In order to 
answer this question, there must first be an overall outline of what information must be 
included.  An appropriate IA evolutionary model should include the following: 
• Incorporates historical perspectives with current criteria. 
• Thoroughly defined approaches to historical data. 
• Focuses on a specific period. 
• Uses historical time and space. 
• Incorporates the four dimensions discussed by McCumber and Maconachy. 
• Focuses on the five pillars of current IA. 
• Comprehensive approach to identifying key concepts. 
 
I analyzed information presented from WWI to Vietnam in chapter three using the NSA 
IAM baseline categories as a foundation.  This information covers the evolutionary 
processes related to IA that were prevalent in each military conflict.  The model below 
demonstrates how the four dimensions; information states, security counter measures, and 
time were significant throughout American military warfare from WWI through Vietnam 
to the present.  Additionally, the two dimensions show the significance of the baseline 
categories and the mapping to the Information States (transmission, storage, processing) 
and Security Counter Measures (technology, policies & practices, people).  Since the 
mapping incorporates current concepts, the overall product should demonstrate the notion 
that older concept do relate to newer ones.   
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Table 11:  IA Evolutionary Model (WWI to Vietnam) 
 
  World War I World War II Korea Vietnam Baseline  
Information  
States           
Transmission 
Courier Dispatch 
Radio 
Tactical 
Telephone 
Telegraph 
Couriers 
Radio 
Tactical 
Telephone 
Telegraph 
Couriers 
Message Centers 
HF Radio 
Telephone 
Message Centers 
VHF Radio (FM)  
Telephone 
External  
Connectivity 
Storage Manual Archive   - Locally 
Manual 
Archive 
  - File System 
Developed 
Microfiche 
  - Systemized 
Archive 
  - Formal Retrieval 
    Sys  Developed 
Centralized Storage  
Facilities 
Magnetic Tape 
Paper Tape 
Back-Ups 
Disposal 
Processing 
Choctaw Talkers 
Manual-
coding/decoding 
Navajo Talkers
Indian Talkers 
Manual -  
code/decode 
Message Centers 
Semi-Automated -  
code/decode 
Centralized - 
Message Processing 
Automated -  
code/decode 
Auditing 
Session Controls 
Counter 
Measures           
Technology Scramblers   - Shift Ciphers 
Enigma, 
Hagelin 
Ultra 
Bombes, 
Purple 
SIGSALY 
M-209 
SIGSALY 
M-209 
SIAGBA 
NESTOR (Secure Voice) 
  - KY-8,   - KY-28 
  - KY-38,  - PRC-77 
Transistors 
Maintenance 
Telecommunications
Virus Protection 
Policies 
  
and  
 
Practices 
Encryption 
Code Books 
Code Books 
COMINT 
Encryption 
SIGINT 
Code Books 
COMINT 
Encryption 
INFO-OPS 
  - Press Releases        
SIGINT 
COMINT, OMSEC 
Encryption, INFOSEC 
Information Operations 
  - Press Releases 
  - Pol Pressure 
Press Releases, OPSEC 
Security Policies 
  - Encryption 
  - Documents 
SIGINT, TEMPEST 
Account 
Management 
Configuration 
Management 
Contingency 
Planning 
IA Documentation 
IA Roles & 
Responsibilities 
Media Sanitization 
People No Structure Decentralized 
Decentralized 
Specialized 
Upper -  
Echelons 
Centralized 
Training Programs 
Awareness 
Functions 
Highly Centralized 
High Level Training 
Compliance -Enforcement 
Awareness 
Personnel Security 
Physical Security 
Training 
  World War I World War II Korea Vietnam Baseline  
Security  
Services  
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Availability 
Confidentiality
Integrity 
Availability 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Authentication 
Availability 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Authentication 
Availability 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Non-Repudiation 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, it is important to demonstrate what evolutionary 
processes are evident throughout the periods covered.  This model shows pertinent details 
of each conflict, the corresponding information states and security counter measures, and 
the NSA IAM baseline categories.  The model also demonstrates how current 
technologies form elements of the evolutionary time dimension, which coincide with 
each of the American wars.  Finally, the model demonstrates the applicability of each of 
the four dimensions to the current framework structure.         
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 V.  Discussion, Limitations and Recommendations 
 
Discussion 
 
The goal of this research effort is to develop a historical account of events and 
concepts related to information and information systems protection during warfare.  The 
previous chapter discussed the findings of this research effort by answering two of the 
three research questions presented in chapter one.  This chapter will answer the final 
research question and discuss the conclusions, recommendations, and suggestions for 
future research. 
 
Research Question Three 
 
The third research question asks, “What lessons can we learn from the 
implementation of IA programs and the evolutionary model of IA?  In order to answer 
this question, we have to focus on how the implementation of various IA programs over 
time affected overall outcomes.  We can see from the historical cascade research 
approach that there are distinct events associated to this conceptual framework 
(McKenny, 1997).   
1. Crisis  
2. Search for a technical solution  
3.  Initial technical solution found  
4.  Adjustments throughout the organization  
5.  Assets formed, which resolves crisis 
6.  A dominant design   
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Every war started with a specific communication technology crisis.  Such crisis stemmed 
from initial inadequacies identified during WWI.  The ill-preparedness of the U.S. 
Military during WWII, Korea, and Vietnam stemmed form end of conflict cutbacks and 
the reallocation of funds to other more pertinent problems of the time.   
Every crisis led to military leaders formulating ideals and innovations that 
developed into technical solutions.  We can also see that policy drives the successful 
implementation of enhancements to security programs during warfare.  Over the span of 
each specific conflict, adjustments were made to the initial technical solution to account 
for changes in plans and policies.  A dominant design was produced once changes were 
incorporated and monies allocated for procurement of additional enhancements.   
We can see from the evolutionary model presented earlier that advancements in 
technology have always driven the dominant design of any specific period.  However, a 
specific dominant design may have been older technologies from previous conflicts 
utilized for the technical solution to newer crisis.  For example, communications 
equipment used for the protection of information and information systems during WWII 
were also used during the early stages of the Korean War.   
The exponential growth of security incidents fueled by technological changes will 
also demonstrate the future of IA related technologies, policies, and practices.  Change in 
the future will happen much more quickly than in the past.  The dominant design focus 
must shift from a reactive nature and focus on proactive leadership.  Such leadership is 
beginning to take shape and several established programs demonstrate the emphasis on 
the future of the IA realm.  Many programs center on training and certification, 
educations programs, and awareness functions.  One example is the NSA’s Information 
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Assurance Scholarship Program, which sponsors individuals to attend colleges and 
universities to study the full spectrum of IA.  This program takes a proactive approach by 
training individuals in IA over the entire spectrum of their adult educational experience.  
This approach coupled with streamlined initiatives will dictate the overall effectiveness 
of future IA related issues.   
 
Limitations 
 Since this research is concerned with a period spanning considerable frame of 
time, it is important to understand that the researcher was not present during the events 
presented.  According to Bannister (2002), historical researchers do not have to be 
present when the events occurred, however, they must reconstruct and interpret events 
from a variety of sources and conceptualize the findings into a logical format for further 
interpretation.   
This research also produces researcher bias.  The information presented is the sole 
interpretation of the author who incorporated various historical methodologies, including 
inductive reasoning techniques, in order to produce snapshot of significant events of the 
past.  Even though there is bias, the picture is complete as interpreted by the author.  
Thus, the final product provides a snapshot that deals primarily with the protection of 
information and systems during American warfare and how these concepts evolved into 
current IA structures. 
 Other examples of information and systems protection can be included as possible 
entities within the evolutionary model.  However, due to time constraints of this thesis 
effort, the list provides a comprehensive view given the above control measures and a 
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focus on major concepts and practices aligned with the baseline categories and the IA 
model. 
 
Suggestions for Future Research 
This research effort focused on the warfare timeframe from WWI to Vietnam. 
Future research could expand the current information and focus on warfare after Vietnam 
through to the present Operation Enduring Freedom in Iraq.  Although IA programs 
throughout the military have been steadily evolving since the adoption of various IA 
strategies, there are significant events and occurrences continue to shape IA as we know 
it.  It would be beneficial to explore these later events to discover what specific changes 
have occurred.  Additionally, such events will provide insight into what is in the future of 
IA programs across various strategic military spectrums. 
Further research could also focus on a closer analysis of the various government 
policies implemented over the period covered by the evolutionary process.  As these 
policies often involved technological advancements and practices, rapidly changing 
environments were seen as threats to smooth operational procedures and troop welfare.  
The implementation of various government policies also paved the way for the 
development of concepts and the overall applicability of the baseline categories and the 
Model dimensions.  These policies stemmed from reactionary processes that favor an 
“after the fact” approach.  It would be interesting to discover what pertinent details of 
policy creation will ensure that such occurrences and reactionary concepts do not occur in 
the future.  
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Conclusions  
 
It is clear that significant events of past military warfare have shaped the current 
structure of military and civilian IA programs.  Even though specific terms and views 
have changed or been re-designated, core concepts directly related to the NSA IAM 
baseline categories and the IA model were prevalent throughout the period covered.  
These concepts are still relevant and active in the current structure of IA.  Additionally, 
these concepts and the entire evolutionary model demonstrate that the concept currently 
known as IA did in fact evolve from earlier forms of information and information 
systems security concepts during warfare.  We can learn from these early examples and 
ultimately shape the future of IA by developing new concepts from those of the past.    
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